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model in which an increase in government consumption is associated with real ap-
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investment have differential effects on the real exchange rate and the relative price
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1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the long-run behavior of real
exchange rates. Along one dimension, the role of an “undervalued” real exchange rate
in accelerating development has been much debated (Rodrik 2007). A connected issue is
the role of the real exchange rate in facilitating the emergence of large global imbalances,
together with the implications of the accumulated net foreign asset position for the long-
run value of the real exchange rate (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002 and 2004, Galstyan
2007, Ricci et al 2008).
Within Europe, the long-run behavior of the real exchange rate has a special signif-
icance in the context of European Monetary Union (EMU). First, bilateral real exchange
rate movements among the member countries take the form of inﬂation differentials,
which cannot be properly interpreted without a view on the long-run drivers of the real
exchange rate. Second, in relation to those countries that plan to join EMU, the projected
path for the long-run real exchange rate matters in determining the correct entry rate for
the nominal exchange rate and the timing of adopting the single currency.
In modelling the long-run behavior of the real exchange rate, the primary focus in
the literature has been on factors such as productivity and the net foreign asset position.
However, government spending has also been identiﬁed as a potential inﬂuence on the
long-run real exchange rate. In the most comprehensive study, Ricci et al (2008) study
the long-run determinants of the real effective exchange rate over 1980-2004 in a panel of
48 countries (combining advanced economies and emerging market economies) and ﬁnd
thatgovernmentconsumptionishighlysigniﬁcant. Moreover, theestimatedcoefﬁcientis
economicallylarge:a1percentagepointincreaseintheratioofgovernmentconsumption
to GDP is associated with a 3 percentage point appreciation of the real effective exchange
rate.
The role of government consumption has previously been highlighted by Froot and
Rogoff (1991), who postulate that increases in government consumption tend to increase
the relative price of nontradables, since government consumption is concentrated on
nontradables. Further empirical support is provided by De Gregorio et al (2004) and
Chinn (1999), who also ﬁnd that increases in government consumption are associated
with real appreciation.1
Our goal in this paper is to expand the analysis of the relation between government
1There is also an active VAR literature on the short-run relation between ﬁscal shocks and the real ex-
change rate (Monacelli and Perotti 2006, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2007, Beetsma and Giuliodori
2007). Our focus here is on the long-run behaviour of the real exchange rate, which is not addressed in
this literature.2 GALSTYAN AND LANE
spending and the long-run real exchange rate. In particular, the role of government in-
vestment has been neglected, with the literature cited above focusing on the role of gov-
ernment consumption. The distinction is important, since we wish to highlight that gov-
ernment consumption and government investment may be expected to have different
effects on the evolution of relative price levels. While an increase in government con-
sumption is typically modelled as increasing the relative demand for nontradables and
thereby leading to real appreciation, a long-run increase in public investment has an am-
biguous impact on the real exchange rate. While an increase in public investment that de-
livers a productivity gain in the tradables sector may generate real appreciation through
the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism, if public investment disproportionately raises pro-
ductivity in the nontradables sector, it may actually lead to real depreciation. Moreover,
if productivity is increased symmetrically in both sectors, there is no long-run impact on
the relative price of nontradables and the real exchange rate.
Weillustratethesemechanismsbylayingoutatwo-sectorsmallopeneconomymodel
that incorporates both government consumption and government investment as poten-
tial inﬂuences on the real exchange rate. In our empirical work, we examine trade-
weighted real effective exchange rates and the relative price of nontradables for a panel
of nineteen advanced economies over 1980-2004.2 Our results conﬁrm that an increase
in government consumption appreciates the real exchange rate and increases the relative
price of nontradables. Consistent with the model, the results for government investment
are more ambiguous, with government investment leading to real depreciation for some
country groups but with a zero effect for others.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows. Section2describesthetheoreticalframe-
work, while Section 3 describes the data and reports the empirical results. Some conclu-
sions are offered in Section 4.
2. Model
In this section, we lay out an adapted version of the standard two-sector small open
economy model (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). The production functions for traded and







2The set of advanced economies are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,







where L and K stand for labor and capital, while Z stands for the public capital stock.
That is, we assume that total factor productivity in each sector is a composite of a sector-
speciﬁc term (A
T, A
N) and the level of public capital.3 Accordingly, productivity in both
sectors is enhanced by a larger stock of public capital but we allow for the impact to
be potentially different across sectors (if Z 6= Z). We assume that L + K = 1, but
L+K < 1. That is, we incorporate a ﬁxed factor of production (normalized to 1) in the
nontraded sector such that the production function in that sector exhibits diminishing
returns to labor and capital.4 The price of the traded good is equal to world price of the
good and is normalized to 1, while the price of non-traded goods is PN.
The accumulation functions for the private capital stocks in the traded and nontraded
sectors are given by
KT = IK
T   KT (3)
KN = IK
N   KN (4)
where I denotes the level of gross investment and  is the depreciation rate. The public
capital stock evolves according to
Z = IZ   Z (5)
We assume that private capital formation in the traded and nontraded sectors only re-
quires the traded good as an input, while public capital formation uses only the non-
traded good as an input.5 The representative household has an instantaneous utility














with the implication that optimal household expenditure shares on traded and non-
traded goods are ﬁxed at (1   
) and 
 respectively, with a unit elasticity of the relative
consumption of nontradables in relation to the relative price of nontradables.
3See also Barro (1990) on the inclusion of public capital in the production function.
4By incorporating a ﬁxed factor, this allows demand-side factors to inﬂuence the structure of long-run
relative prices. As is well known, demand-side factors are irrelevant for long-run relative prices if both
sectors show constant returns to scale in mobile factors (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). The main results do not
change if we also allow for a ﬁxed factor in the traded sector.
5In fact, the details of the investment process are not important for our analysis. These polar assumptions
just simpliﬁes the presentation of the model.4 GALSTYAN AND LANE





We assume that that the price of the non-traded good in the rest of the world is ﬁxed and
normalized to 1, such that changes in P correspond to changes in the real exchange rate.
The government runs a balanced budget, levying lump-sum taxes equal to the value
of total government consumption and government investment
T = GT + PN(GN + IZ) (8)
where GT;GN are the levels of public consumption of the traded and nontraded goods
respectively and IZ is the level of public investment.
Households own the domestic stocks of capital in the traded and nontraded sectors.
There are no inter-sectoral or international capital adjustment costs, so that the return
on capital is equal to the exogenously-ﬁxed world interest rate. In addition, households
own the ﬁxed factor in the nontraded sector and so receive the income accruing to that
factor (the residual claimant on proﬁts in the nontraded sector). Accordingly, households
face the following budget constraint
B = rB + r(KT + KN) + w(LT + LN)   (IK
N + IK
T )   CT   PNCN + N   T (9)
where B is an international bond that pays the ﬁxed real world interest rate r (in terms
of tradables), N = (1   L   K)PNYN is the aggregate proﬁt in the nontraded sector
and T is the tax burden.
Forsimplicity, weassumeaninelasticaggregatelaborsupply. Laborisperfectlyinter-
sectorally mobile, such that the equilibrium in the labor market is
LN + LT = L (10)
The equilibrium in the non-traded goods sector is
YN = CN + GN + IZ (11)
while the trade balance is determined by
TB = YT   CT   GT   (IK
N + IK
T ) (12)THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 5
Equations (1) to (12) together with the ﬁrst-order conditions for private consumption
and private investment and the proﬁts of the non-traded sector form the system.
Our primary interest is in the long-run behavior of the real exchange rate. Accord-
ingly, we focus on the steady-state solution of the model. In order to obtain an analytical
solution, we assume no depreciation.6 We initially solve for a benchmark steady state in
which the levels of net foreign assets and government consumption are zero (in order to
obtain a closed-form solution). Then we log-linearize the system around this benchmark,
in order to examine the sensitivity of the steady-state real exchange rate to shifts in the
steady-state values of the exogenous variables.














In the next stage, we log-linearize around this steady state and solve the system. The
equation of primary interest is the one governing the real exchange rate, ^ P = 
 ^ PN, with
the relative price of non-traded goods given by
^ PN =   ^ AN +
1   K
1   K
^ AT + 0(r ^ B + [GN   GT]) + 1 ^ Z (14)
wherehattedvariablesdenotepercentagedeviationsfromthesteady-statevalues.9 Equa-
tion (14) shows that an improvement in productivity in the nontraded sector generates
real depreciation and a decline in the relative price of nontradables, while an increase in
productivity in the traded sector generates real appreciation and an increase in the rel-
ative price of nontradables, where these forces operate according to the classic Balassa-
Samuelson mechanism.10 The other key coefﬁcients are
0 =








(1   K)Z   (1   K)Z
L
<=> 0 (16)
6With depreciation the model has to be solved numerically.
7See Appendix A for the set of steady state equations.
















9The equations governing sectoral output and consumptiond dynamics are given in Appendix B.
10A symmetric increase in productivity in both sectors generates real appreciation if the nontraded sector
is less capital intensive than the traded sector (K < K).6 GALSTYAN AND LANE
Since 0 > 0, the level and composition of spending matters for the real exchange rate.
In particular, a country that is a long-run creditor ( ^ B > 0) experiences real apprecia-
tion, since the interest income on the creditor position enables an increase in the steady-
state level of consumption.11 In the traded sector, this translates into a long-run trade
deﬁcit (TB =  r ^ B), while the increase in demand for the nontraded good generates real
appreciation due to the presence of the ﬁxed factor in the nontraded sector.12 More-
over, an increase in government consumption that is concentrated on nontraded goods
([GN  GT] > 0) also generates real appreciation by shifting the composition of aggregate
consumption towards the nontraded sector.13
Finally, the effect of an increase in the public capital stock on the real exchange rate is
given by the coefﬁcient 1, which has an ambiguous sign. If an increase in public capital
has a symmetric impact on productivity in both sectors (Z = Z) and both sectors have
similar capital shares (K = K), the real exchange rate is unaffected by the level of
the public capital stock. If Z = Z but the nontraded sector is less capital intensive
(K > K), then an increase in public capital generates real appreciation, by the same
logic as a symmetric improvement in the sector-speciﬁc productivity terms AT and AN.
However, even if K > K, it is possible to construct scenarios in which an increase
in the public capital stock generates real depreciation if productivity in the nontraded
sector is more sensitive to the level of public capital than is productivity in the traded
sector (Z < Z). Accordingly, the sign of the relation between public investment and
the real exchange rate is ultimately an empirical matter.
3. Data and Empirical Speciﬁcation
3.1. Data
The data covers years 1980 to 2004. The relative price of non-traded goods is constructed
using the ratio of the deﬂators of services sectors to manufacturing sectors from the EU
KLEMS database (Timmer et al 2008).14 The relative productivity differential variable is
11See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004) and Galstyan (2007).
12As noted earlier, if the share of the ﬁxed factor in the non-traded sector were equal to zero, then 0 = 0,
and the demand side is redundant for the real exchange rate.
13A balanced increase in government consumption across the two sectors has no effect on the relative
price of non-traded goods. Since the aggregate labour supply is inelastic, the level of production in each
sector is unchanged by a shift in the mix between public and private consumption that leaves aggregate
consumption in each sector unchanged (if GT and GN are simultaneously increased by one unit each, CT
and CN each decline by one unit).
14The services sector is deﬁned as the aggregate of ‘Wholesale and Retail Trade’, ‘Hotels and Restaurants’,
‘Transport and Storage and Communication’, ‘Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services’ andTHE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 7
constructed using relative labor productivities from the same KLEMS database. The real
exchange rate is constructed using the consumer price index and the nominal period-
average exchange rate from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics database, with the trade weights calculated by Bayoumi et al (2005). GDP per
capita (measured in constant 2000 US dollars), is taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database. The balance on goods and services (in current USD)
is from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database. The
current-dollar value of GDP is from International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook database. Government consumption and government investment in current
US dollars are taken from the OECD.
It is important to measure variables in relative terms in order to capture the forces
driving the structure of international relative prices. Accordingly, variables for each
country are expressed relative to a weighted-average across the set of OECD trading
partners in the database.15
3.2. Empirical Evidence
Next, we turn to more formal econometric evidence. Table 1 shows the statistics from
panel unit root and cointegration tests. The tests do not reject the null of a unit root for
the real exchange rate and the relative price of nontradables. In addition, the tests indi-
cate non-stationarity for several of the explanatory variables (the productivity differen-
tial, relative GDP per capita and the trade balance). The evidence for the ﬁscal variables
is mixed: while the PP-Fisher unit root test indicates non-stationarity, the other tests re-
ject the unit root null. However, it is clear that the ﬁscal variables are highly persistent (a
panel estimate of an AR(1) speciﬁcation gives an estimated coefﬁcient of 0.9), such that
it is pragmatic to also treat the ﬁscal variables as non-stationary.16 The Kao cointegra-
tion test clearly rejects the null of no cointegration among the variables for both the real
exchange rate and relative price of nontradables equations.
Since non-stationarity is pervasive in the set of variables, we focus on the panel dy-
‘Community Social and Personal Services’. In this case the aggregate price index is the weighted average of
sectoral price indices, where the weights are the value shares in the base year.
15For most members of the euro area (excluding Germany and Greece), the trade share with the set of 19
OECD countries is more than 70 percent. Among the other countries, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden
and the United Kingdom have a trade share of more than 70 percent. Only the United States and Japan have
approximately 50 percent share, while Australia has a share of 60 percent. Accordingly, using the 19 OECD
countries in the database to form trade-weighted averages is more or less representative.
16We also ran the dynamic OLS estimator on artiﬁcial data with three non-stationary variables and one
persistent but stationary variable. Our simulation suggests that dynamic OLS is a good estimator for the
scenario.8 GALSTYAN AND LANE
namic OLS (DOLS) estimator to establish the long-run relation between the explanatory
variables and the real exchange rate and the relative price of nontradables. In general,
our empirical speciﬁcation is based on equation (14).
The speciﬁcation for DOLS(-1,1) is
yit = i + t + 0xit +
j=1 X
j= 1
xit j + it (17)
where yit is the dependent variable and x is the set of explanatory variables.17 The 
coefﬁcients in equation (17) capture the long-run impact on y of long-run changes in
the x variables. We are interested in explaining the long-run behavior of: (a) the real
exchange rate; and (b) the relative price of nontradables.18
For the real exchange rate, we plausibly assume that the productivity differential be-
tween the traded and nontraded sectors is increasing in the level of GDP per capita.19
Accordingly, we expect a positive long-run relation between the relative level of GDP
per capita (measured relative to trading partners) and the real exchange rate. In relation
to the positive impact of international investment income on the real exchange rate, we
exploit the steady-state relation that the trade balance surplus should equal the inter-
national investment income deﬁcit (TB =  rB) and thereby include the trade balance
surplusasaregressor(theexpectedsignisnegative).20 Finally, governmentconsumption
and government investment (both measured relative to trading partners) are included,
where the model suggests that an increase in government consumption should be asso-
ciated with real appreciation but the sign on government investment is not tied down.21
The speciﬁcation is quite similar for the relative price of nontradables, with the exception
that GDP per capita and the ﬁscal variables are measured in absolute terms, rather than
relative to trading partners.22
17The choice of one lead and lag is dictated by the sample length.
18Although these two variables are isomorphic in the simpliﬁed model that was presented in Section 2,
we recognize that various factors can generate substantial differences in the empirical behavior of these
variables.
19Since government investment operates via a productivity channel, we do not want to directly include
a productivity measure in the regression speciﬁcation. Rather, we include GDP per capita as a general
correlate of the level of productivity.
20See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) and Galstyan (2007). An alternative is to include the level of net
foreign assets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004 and Ricci et al 2008). However, the long-run relation between
net foreign assets and the trade balance depends on the composition of the international balance sheet and
the levels of returns earned on foreign assets and liabilities. Accordingly, the long-run trade balance is a
better indicator of the long-run level of net international investment income.
21Although the model is written in terms of the level of public capital Z, we assume a close correspon-
dence between the long-run level of public investment and the long-run level of public capital.
22The dependent variable is the relative price of nontradables, for which the value of domestic ﬁscalTHE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 9
Before turning to the panel DOLS estimates that focus on the time series dimension,
we show graphically the relation between changes in government spending and changes
in the real exchange rate along the cross-sectional dimension. Figure 1 shows the relation
between the cross-country relation between changes in the ﬁscal variables and changes
in the real exchange rate over 1980-2004.23 The real exchange rate is positively correlated
with government consumption (the correlation is 0:52), while it is negatively correlated
with government investment (the correlation is  0:26). Accordingly, the cross-country
data supports the basic thrust of the theoretical model, by highlighting the real exchange
rate is differentially sensitive to government consumption and government investment.
The DOLS results for the real exchange rate are presented in Table 2. We run the
regressions for a variety of country groups. In addition to the full sample of OECD coun-
tries, we also differentiate between larger and smaller economies by running separate
panel regressions for the G3 and non-G3 samples.24 We also consider the sample of EMU
member countries. This group is especially interesting, since real exchange rates for these
countries have been much less volatile since the formation of European Monetary Union
in 1999 – the elimination of bilateral nominal exchange rate shocks among the member
countries may make it easier to capture the long-run patterns that are the focus of this
paper. In turn, we allow for differences in country size within the EMU bloc by run-
ning separate panel regressions for the E4 group of the four largest countries (France,
Germany, Italy and Spain) and the group of smaller member countries (non-E4 group).
Column (1) shows the estimates for the full sample. In relation to the ﬁscal variables,
an 1 percentage point increase in relative government consumption is associated with a
1.2 percent appreciation in the real exchange rate and this estimate is signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. In contrast, relative government investment has a negative sign but is not
signiﬁcant. Accordingly, the general pattern is in line with predictions of the theoretical
model, in that the composition of government spending matters: an increase in govern-
ment consumption appreciates the real exchange rate in the long-run, but government
investment does not. The control variables also are highly signiﬁcant in the expected
variable is important. If the dependent variable were the difference in the relative price of nontradables
acrosss countries, then the ﬁscal variables should be entered in relative terms. We have run this alternative
speciﬁcation - these results are available upon request.
23More precisely, Figure 1 plots the residual of the change in the real exchange rate against the residuals
of the changes in government investment and government consumption, after each of these variables has
been regressed on the set of controls: changes in the trade balance, relative GDP per capita and the omitted
ﬁscal variable. Accordingly, the scatter plot captures the conditional comovement between these variables.
24The G3 is deﬁned as Germany, Japan and the United States. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004)
andGalstyan(2007)onthereasonswhythesensitivityofrelativepricestofundamentalsshouldsystemically
vary with country size. In the simpliﬁed model in Section 2, the share of nontradables in consumption (
)
servesasaproxyforcountrysize, inthatwemayexpectlargereconomiestohaverelativelylargernontraded
sectors.10 GALSTYAN AND LANE
manner, with an increase in relative GDP per capita and a long-run trade deﬁcit both
associated with real appreciation.
Columns (2) and (3) show the results when the sample is split between the G3 and
non-G3 groups. In each group, the main ﬁscal results from the full sample carry over in
qualitative terms. However, in line with the ﬁndings of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002,
2004) and Galstyan (2007), the magnitudes of the coefﬁcients are much larger for the G3
group. It is also noteworthy that the estimated semi-elasticity of the real exchange rate
with respect to relative government consumption for the G3 group is quite similar to
the estimate reported by Ricci et al (2008). Finally, we note that the control variables are
signiﬁcant for the non-G3 group but are individually insigniﬁcant for the G3 group.
We turn our attention to the EMU sample in columns (4)-(6). The results are broadly
similar to the wider panel, with the exception that neither ﬁscal variable is individually
signiﬁcant for the E4 group of larger member countries.
The estimates for the relative price of nontradables are reported in Table 3. An in-
crease in government consumption is signiﬁcantly associated with an increase in the
relative price of nontradables for the EMU and E4 samples. In contrast, it is striking that
an increase in government investment is signiﬁcantly associated with a decline in the
relative price of nontradables for each sample, with the exception of the E4 group. For
the non-G3 and non-E4 samples, the approximate coefﬁcient estimate of  3:4 indicates
that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of government investment to GDP (which
corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in the panel data) is associated with a
3:4 percent decline in the relative price of nontradables. In relation to the control vari-
ables, we note that the relative price of nontradables is increasing in the level of GDP per
capita across all country groups.25
Accordingtoourmodel, governmentinvestmentaffectsthestructureofrelativeprices
through its impact on relative sectoral productivity: it generates real appreciation if pro-
ductivity is raised relatively more in the traded sector than the nontraded sector, and
conversely it is associated with real depreciation if the productivity gains are concen-
trated in the nontraded sector. We directly examine this mechanism in Table 4, where
we regress (A
N=A
T) on GDP per capita and the level of government investment, using
the same DOLS(1,1) estimator. The results in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table
3, in that there is evidence that an increase in government investment disproportion-
ately raises productivity in the nontraded sector for most of the country groups. (As
expected, an increase in GDP per capita is associated with an increased in traded-sector
productivity relative to nontraded-sector productivity).
25In addition, the trade balance is positive and marginally signiﬁcant for the non-E4 group.THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 11
4. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper has been to show that the composition of government spend-
ing matters for the long-run dynamics of the real exchange rate. In our theoretical model,
we have shown that government consumption typically leads to real appreciation but
that the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to government investment depends on how
an increase in the public capital stock differentially affects sectoral productivity levels in
the traded and nontraded sectors. Our empirical estimates conﬁrmed that government
consumption indeed generates real appreciation for the full sample, while showing that
government investment has no signiﬁcant long-run impact on the real exchange rate for
the set of EMU member countries.
Next, we checked whether the ﬁscal variables operate through the relative price of
nontradables in the manner embedded in the theoretical analysis. We found that an in-
crease in government consumption raises the relative price of nontradables for the EMU
sample and sub-samples, while government investment is associated with a decline in
the relative price of nontradables for most country groups. In turn, we found that the
productivity gains from an increase in government investment are concentrated in the
nontraded sector, which is consistent with the relative price evidence and the mecha-
nism speciﬁed in our theoretical model.12 GALSTYAN AND LANE
Appendix A: Benchmark Steady State

































































In the benchmark steady state, the levels of consumption of traded and nontraded
goods are equal to the respective outputs and are given by










where we normalise AT = AN = 1 and we assume a zero depreciation rate such that the
steady state levels of private and public investment are zero.THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 13
Appendix B: Sectoral Equations of Motion
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Panel A: Unit Root Test Levin, Lin Im, Pesaran PP-Fisher
and Chu and Shin Chi-Square
ln(REER) 0.33 0.04 0.07
ln(RNP) 0.79 1.00 0.99
ln(Prod. Diff.) 0.18 1.00 0.31
Trade Balance 0.00 0.00 0.00
ln(Rel. GDP per capita) 0.30 0.41 0.78
Rel. Govt. Consumption 0.04 0.03 0.59
Rel. Govt. Investment 0.00 0.00 0.05
Govt. Consumption 0.06 0.02 0.47
Govt. Investment 0.00 0.03 0.01
ln(GDP per capita) 0.22 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Kao Cointegration Test
ln(REER) Trade Balance ln(Rel. GDP per capita) -6.12
Rel. Govt. Consumption Rel. Govt. Investment (0.00)
ln(RNP) Trade Balance ln(GDP per capita) -1.67
Govt. Consumption Govt. Investment (0.05)
ln(Prod. Diff.) ln(GDP per capita) Govt. Investment -2.14
(0.02)
Note: ln stands for natural logarithm; REER indicates the real effective exchange rate
computed by the authors using trade shares provided by Bayoumi et al (2005) using
the set of countries listed in Appendix A; RNP is the unit value of services relative to
manufacturing; Prod. Diff. is the ratio of labor productivity of services to manufacturing
sector; Trade Balance is the trade balance as a share of GDP; Rel. GDP per capita is real
relative GDP per capita; Rel. Govt. Consumption is relative government consumption
as a share of GDP; Rel. Govt. Investment is government investments as a share of GDP;
Govt. ConsumptionisthegovernmentconsumptionasashareofGDP;Govt. Investment
is government investment as a share of GDP; GDP per capita is real GDP per capita.18 GALSTYAN AND LANE
Table 2: Real Exchange Rates: Long-Run Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rel. Govt. Consumption 1.64 2.70 1.64 1.77 2.17 1.63
(.47)*** (1.34)** (.40)*** (.40)*** (1.52) (.46)***
Rel. Govt. Investment -0.64 -8.02 -1.06 -0.99 1.13 -1.28
(1.23) (4.85) (1.14) (1.12) (2.53) (1.37)
Rel. GDP per capita 0.31 0.48 0.28 0.23 0.40 0.19
(.09)*** (.80) (.08)*** (.09)*** (.26) (.10)*
Trade Balance -1.15 -0.50 -0.99 -1.26 -1.54 -1.24
(.20)*** (1.11) (.21)*** (.24)*** (.54)*** (.30)***
R2 0.61 0.62 0.55 0.53 0.29 0.59
Marginal R2 0.14 0.29 0.15 0.23 0.26 0.24
Observations 418 66 352 242 88 154
Sample All G3 Non-G3 EMU E4 Non-E4
Note: Real effective exchange rate is computed by the authors using trade shares pro-
vided by Bayoumi et al (2005) using the set of countries listed in Appendix A; ln stands
for natural logarithm; Rel. Govt. Consumption is relative government consumption as
a share of GDP; Rel. Govt. Investment is relative government investments as a share of
GDP; Rel. GDP per capita is the log of real relative GDP per capita; Trade Balance is the
trade balance as a share of GDP.
Marginal R2 is constructed by subtracting the ratio of the residual sum of squares of ﬁxed
effects regression with the set of control variables over the residual sum of square of the
regression on the ﬁxed effects only from one.
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Table 3: Relative Price of Nontradables: Long-Run Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt. Consumption 0.89 0.36 0.96 1.70 6.73 1.26
(.70) (1.39) (.79) (.90)* (1.32)*** (.88)
Govt. Investment -2.25 8.41 -3.54 -1.86 0.15 -3.36
(.95)** (3.79)** (1.07)*** (1.09)* (1.76) (.92)***
GDP per capita 0.63 1.05 0.59 0.63 0.79 0.54
(.04)*** (.12)*** (.05)*** (.05)*** (.07)*** (.05)***
Trade Balance -0.44 0.58 -0.40 0.59 0.99 0.67
(.40) (1.05) (.44) (.36) (.50)* (.43)
R2 0.71 0.86 0.69 0.74 0.92 0.70
Marginal R2 0.58 0.80 0.56 0.71 0.89 0.68
Observations 418 66 352 242 88 154
Sample All G3 Non-G3 EMU E4 Non-E4
Note: Relative Price of Nontradables is the unit value of services relative to manufactur-
ing; ln stands for natural logarithm; Govt. Consumption is government consumption as
a share of GDP; Govt. Investment is government investments as a share of GDP; GDP
per capita is the log of real GDP per capita; Trade Balance is the trade balance as a share
of GDP.
Marginal R2 is constructed by subtracting the ratio of the residual sum of squares of ﬁxed
effects regression with the set of control variables over the residual sum of square of the
regression on the ﬁxed effects only from one.
***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1,5 and 10 percent respectively.20 GALSTYAN AND LANE
Table 4: Relative Sectoral Productivity Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita -0.92 -1.21 -0.89 -1.02 -0.97 -1.05
(.06)*** (.13)*** (.07)*** (.07)*** (.11)*** (.08)***
Govt. Investment 3.38 -2.31 3.94 3.26 -1.15 5.44
(1.39)** (2.76) (1.64)** (1.31)** (2.25) (1.40)***
R2 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.91
Marginal R2 0.72 0.81 0.70 0.79 0.79 0.80
Observations 418 66 352 242 88 154
Sample All G3 Non-G3 EMU E4 Non-E4
Note: GDP per capita is the log of real GDP per capita; Govt. Investment is government
investments as a share of GDP.
Marginal R2 is constructed by subtracting the ratio of the residual sum of squares of ﬁxed
effects regression with the set of control variables over the residual sum of square of the
regression on the ﬁxed effects only from one.
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